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On November 25, 2009, the financial world was shocked when Dubai 
World requested a restructuring of $26 billion (USD) in debts. This debt 
standstill caused much disturbance in capital markets and became known as the 
“Dubai Debt Crisis”. The main concern was the delay in the repayment of the $4 
billion sukuk, or Islamic bond, of Dubai World‟s developer Nakheel, which was 
especially known for the construction of the Dubai Palm Islands.1  The 
“Nakheel Sukuk” would mature on December 14, 2009. The restructuring 
request caused much distress among the sukuk holders, because several analyses 
by the lawyers of Dubai World and its creditors showed that the sukuk holders 
would probably not be able to rely on the level of protection they had expected. 
This raised questions about the financial structure of the Nakheel Sukuk and the 
legal issues underlying these kinds of Islamic financial structures. Although 
until November 2009, the impact of the credit crunch on the Islamic financial 
markets had seemed rather small, this perception changed at the end of 2009. 
However, contrary to most expectations, the main legal issues had nothing 
to do with the Islamic financial structure underlying the Nakheel Sukuk; the 
issues were more inherent to the legal system of the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE). Questions relating to private international law were dominating the 
minds of the experts. This article contains a short introduction to Islamic 
finance, followed by a description of sukuk and a case study of the Nakheel 
Sukuk. The article clarifies the legal structure of these financial instruments, 
focusing primarily on the property law issues dominating this field. Next, 
private international law issues relating to Islamic financial structures are 
discussed—including a description of the legal framework of the UAE. 
                                                          
  Omar Salah, LLM, is a PhD candidate at the TISCO research institute of the Private Law 
Department of Tilburg Law School (the Netherlands). The subject of his PhD research is Islamic 
finance and he teaches the LLM course Corporate Finance at Tilburg Law School. He is also 
affiliated with the law firm De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek. 
 1. Sukuk are among the most important Islamic financial products and are often regarded as 
the Islamic equivalent of bonds. Sukuk is the plural of the Arabic word sakk, which can be translated 
as „(financial) certificate‟. 
20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. PUBLICIST [Vol. 4 
ISLAMIC FINANCE: SUKUK 
The Islamic finance market has grown remarkably in recent years. The 
sector is gaining ground in the Western world as well, as is evident from certain 
developments in Europe and the United States. In Europe, countries such as the 
United Kingdom and France are working on a legal framework to develop a 
market for Islamic finance. In order to become one of the Islamic financial 
centers of Europe, these European countries have made efforts to change their 
legislation in order to facilitate Islamic financial products and capitalize on the 
growth of the sector.2 Islamic banking assets rose by 28.6 % in 2009 to $822 
billion from $639 billion in 2008.3 
In order to understand the legal structure of the Nakheel Sukuk, the Shari’a 
background of sukuk needs to be discussed in short.
 4 The Shari’a background of 
sukuk results in concrete requirements, which in turn determine the formation of 
a sukuk structure. Understanding the background and specific requirements of 
sukuk enables one to gain a better perception of the structure of Nakheel Sukuk. 
Although sukuk are often regarded as Islamic bonds, there are significant 
differences between a sukuk structure and a conventional bond structure. The 
main reason for these differences has to do with the fact that all Islamic financial 
products must meet certain Shari’a principles. From an Islamic perspective, 
trading and making a profit are stimulated so long as there is no involvement in 
haram (impermissible under Islamic law) activities. These prohibited 
investments concern investments relating to, inter alia, alcohol, drugs, 
armaments, military technology, pornography, prostitution, and gambling. 
However, permissibility is the default—all commercial transactions and 
contracts are presumptively permissible, unless there is a clear prohibition. 
There are three main prohibitions within Islamic finance: (i) paying and 
receiving interest is prohibited (prohibition on riba);5 (ii) uncertainty in 
contracts must be avoided as much as possible (prohibition on gharar); and (iii) 
speculation and gambling are not allowed (the prohibition on mayseer and 
qimar). Within Islamic finance, the concept of interest is replaced by profit and 
loss sharing. Therefore, it is possible to make a profit without collecting interest. 
These Islamic financial principles determine the structure of Islamic financial 
transactions. Below, this is illustrated by looking at a specific sukuk transaction: 
the Nakheel Sukuk. 
                                                          
 2. D. Oakley, The Future of Islamic Finance, London leads in race to be western hub, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 8, 2009; Islamic finance in France, Sharia calling, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 
14, 2009. 
 3. The Banker & HSBC Amanah, Top 500 Islamic Financial Institutions, available at 
http://top500islamic.thebanker.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=top500.home&CFID=1053940&CFTOK
EN=10177553. 
 4. Shari’a means literary „the way‟ or the „path to the water source.‟ It is the body of Islamic 
religious law and is often used as a synonym for Islamic law. 
 5. Although riba is more than a mere prohibition on interest, as will be illustrated below, at 
this point a simplified explanation of this term will suffice. 
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Sukuk are certificates representing ownership claims in underlying tangible 
assets. As mentioned above, due to the prohibition of riba, receiving and paying 
interest is forbidden within these transactions. Another implication of the 
prohibition on riba is that the trading of debt (bai al-dayn) is prohibited. 
Therefore, the presence of underlying tangible assets is required within these 
transactions. For the sukuk to be tradable in the secondary markets, the sukuk 
holders must gain some form of ownership in these underlying tangible assets.6 
Mostly, this is structured by giving the sukuk holders the beneficial ownership of 
these assets. As the beneficial owners, they are entitled to the profit that is 
generated over these underlying assets. The sukuk holders will receive this profit 
as the beneficial owners and there is, thus, no interest payment. Another 
important result of this ownership requirement is that the sukuk holders are 
trading their ownership in the capital markets by selling the sukuk and not 
merely a debt claim. This does not violate the prohibition on bai al-dayn and is 
permissible. Consequently, there is no riba in such sukuk transactions and the 
structures are permissible from a Shari’a perspective. 
The issuance of the Nakheel Sukuk was based on the ijarah contract, which 
is comparable to a conventional lease contract.7 The underlying sukuk structure 
was the sukuk manfaa-ijarah.
 8 In essence, this structure is comparable to a 
conventional lease-and-lease-back transaction between the party who is in need 
of financing (the originator) and a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). The 
transaction starts with the originator, who sets up an SPV and selects certain 
tangible assets for the transaction. The originator leases the tangible assets 
pursuant to a Head Ijarah Lease Agreement to the SPV. This is often for a long 
lease period (e.g., 50 years) and the entire lease sum is paid up front. This 
amount is financed by the SPV through the issuance of sukuk. The SPV holds 
the assets in trust for the sukuk holders, so the sukuk holders become the 
beneficial owners of the underlying assets. Next, the SPV leases the tangible 
assets back to the originator in accordance with a Sub Ijarah Lease Agreement 
for a short period (e.g., three years). During the entire lease period, the SPV 
holds the assets in trust as a trustee for the sukuk holders (the beneficial owners). 
The originator makes periodic lease payments to the SPV. The sukuk holders are 
entitled to these lease payments, since they are the beneficiaries of the 
underlying tangible assets. The SPV in turn pays these lease payments as 
periodic payments on the sukuk to the sukuk holders. At maturity date (e.g., after 
                                                          
 6. AAOIFI Shariah Board, Resolutions on Sukuk, February 2008, Bahrain: AAOIFI 2008, 
available at http://www.aaoifi.com/aaoifi_sb_sukuk_Feb2008_Eng.pdf. 
 7. There are several Islamic financial contracts which are the foundation of Islamic financial 
products such as sukuk. For more on Islamic financial contracts, see M.T. USMANI, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC FINANCE (Arab & Islamic Laws Series) (2001); M.A. EL-GAMAL, 
ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PRACTICE (2006); M. AYUB, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC 
FINANCE (2008). 
 8. The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) 
issues several standards which are followed worldwide within the Islamic finance sector. Shari’a 
Standard No. 17 of the AAOIFI on Investment Sukuk identifies fourteen sukuk structures. One of 
these structures is the sukuk manfaa-ijarah. 
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three years), the Sub Ijarah Lease Agreement ends and the Head Ijarah Lease 
Agreement is terminated. The originator pays an amount of money equal to the 
principal amount of the sukuk holders. The SPV will use this sum to repay the 
principal amount to the sukuk holders. This rather abstract description will be 
clarified below in the discussion of the structure of the Nakheel Sukuk. 
NAKHEEL SUKUK: A CASE STUDY9 
The sukuk manfaa-ijarah structure was used for the Nakheel Sukuk. The 
originator in this structure was Nakheel Holdings-1 LLC (Nakheel Holdings 1). 
Nakheel Holdings 1, Nakheel Holdings-2 LLC (Nakheel Holdings 2), and 
Nakheel Holdings-3 LLC (Nakheel Holdings 3) were subsidiaries of Nakheel 
World LLC (Nakheel World), which held 99% of the shares in all three Nakheel 
Holdings. All three Nakheel Holdings had a subsidiary, Nakheel PJSC, which 
was operating in the real estate sector in Dubai. The parent company and 100% 
shareholder of Nakheel World was Dubai World, a 100% state-owned 
company.10 The SPV was Nakheel Development Limited (Nakheel SPV), a 
newly incorporated Free Zone company with limited liability in the Jebel Ali 
Free Zone.11 
Pursuant to a purchase agreement, Nakheel Holdings 1 sold the leasehold 
rights to the underlying tangible assets for a period of 50 years (the sukuk assets) 
to Nakheel SPV. The underlying tangible assets were the land, buildings, and 
other property known as DWF South and Crescent Lands at Dubai Waterfront. 
The developer wanted to build a city twice the size of Hong Kong Island, with 
skyscrapers for 1.5 million residents, all ringed by a 75 km canal at Dubai 
Waterfront.12 The aggregate amount for the entire lease period of 50 years was 
paid by Nakheel SPV to Nakheel Holdings 1. This amount was raised by the 
issuance of sukuk. Nakheel SPV issued sukuk certificates for a period of three 
years. The issue price of these Nakheel Sukuk certificates was $3.52 billion and 
the entire amount was used to purchase the sukuk assets.13 Nakheel SPV acted 
as agent and trustee for and on behalf of the sukuk holders, in accordance with 
an agency declaration and a declaration of trust. Pursuant to this declaration of 
trust, Nakheel SPV declared a trust in favor of the sukuk holders over its title to 
the sukuk assets and all rights and benefits derived from all security documents 
and transaction documents (the trust assets). Consequently, each sakk 
                                                          
 9. The main source for this case study has been the prospectus/offering circular of the 
Nakheel Sukuk.  Offering Circular, Nakheel Development Ltd., available at 
http://blogs.thenational.ae/economy_blog/Nakheel%20Development%201%20Prospectus.pdf. 
[hereinafter Offering Circular Nakheel]. 
 10. This is merely a simplified overview of the group structure. 
 11. Offering Circular Nakheel, supra note 9 at 53. 
 12. A. Sakoui & R. Wigglesworth, Waterfront washout tests law on sukuk restructuring, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 3, 2009. 
 13. The sukuk were eventually oversubscribed. The total amount raised with the Nakheel 
Sukuk was approximately USD 4 billion. 
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represented an undivided beneficial ownership of the trust assets held in trust for 
the sukuk holders.14 Furthermore, the agency declaration stipulated that Nakheel 
SPV was acting as agent for and on behalf of the sukuk holders. 
Next, Nakheel SPV, as lessor, leased the sukuk assets to Nakheel Holdings 
2, as lessee, for a period of three years. The lease comprised six consecutive 
periods of six months each. In accordance with a servicing agency agreement 
between the lessor and the lessee, the lessee was responsible for the major 
maintenance, structural repair, proprietorship taxes, and insurances in respect to 
the sukuk assets. The rental payments of the lease periods matched the periodic 
distribution payments on the sukuk15, so Nakheel SPV would pay the lease 
payments to the sukuk holders. At the redemption date of the sukuk, the lessee 
had to purchase the sukuk assets from the lessor in accordance with a purchase 
undertaking at a certain exercise price. This exercise price was equal to the 
redemption amount of the sukuk and would be used to pay back the principal 
amount to the sukuk holders. In this way the sukuk were redeemed. 
An innovative element of this structure was its pre-initial public offering 
(pre-IPO) convertible aspect, which in essence made these sukuk pre-IPO 
convertible sukuk. Sukuk holders had the right to subscribe for qualifying public 
offering (QPO) shares at the QPO exercise price, which gave the sukuk holders a 
discount of five percent. They had this right for the entire three-year period 
during which the sukuk were outstanding, for any primary or secondary equity 
offering by Nakheel PJSC and its subsidiaries listed on any international stock 
exchange. The rights of the sukuk holders to subscribe for QPO shares were, 
however, limited. The aggregate number of QPO shares could be no greater than 
30% of the aggregate number of QPO shares to be issued in that QPO, and the 
aggregate value of the subscription rights in all QPO‟s could not exceed 25% of 
the sukuk issue amount ($3.52 billion).16 The sukuk holders had a look back 
option, which meant that in certain circumstances they could exercise their 
subscription rights twelve months after the redemption date of the sukuk. In 
accordance with a subscription rights sale undertaking between Nakheel SPV 
and Nakheel Holdings 2, Nakheel Holdings 2 delivered the QPO shares to 
Nakheel SPV, which Nakheel SPV then delivered to the sukuk holders. Figure 1 





                                                          
 14. Offering Circular Nakheel, supra note 9 at 54. 
 15. Id. at 12. 
 16. Id. at 74. 
24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. PUBLICIST [Vol. 4 
Transfer leasehold 


































Nakheel Holdings 1, Nakheel Holdings 2, and Nakheel Holdings 3 (the 
co-obligors) granted a co-obligor guarantee to Nakheel SPV: each of them 
jointly and severally guaranteed payment, delivery, and other obligations.18 
Under this co-obligor guarantee, the co-obligors entered into various covenants, 
such as a negative pledge, change of control provisions, limitations on financial 
indebtedness, asset sales, loans, dividends, the granting of security, and the 
granting of undertakings to maintain insurance and provide financial 
information. In addition, Dubai World issued a guarantee to Nakheel SPV for 
the payment obligations of the co-obligors. Under that guarantee, Dubai World 
also entered into certain covenants such as a negative pledge and maintenance of 
ownership undertaking (stating that it would maintain ownership and control 
over its subsidiaries).19 Figure 2 gives an illustration of the guarantee structure 
of the Nakheel Sukuk. 
                                                          
 17. Author‟s own. 
 18. Offering Circular Nakheel, supra note 9 at 59. 
 19. Id. at 151-2. 
Underlying 
tangible assets 
2010] DUBAI DEBT CRISIS 25 
Figure 220 
Nakheel Sukuk Guarantee Structure 
 
For greater sukuk holder security, a collateral security structure was set 
up securing the payment obligations of the co-obligors.21 Nakheel Holdings 1 
granted two mortgages, free of any security interest and encumbrance, on the 
underlying tangible assets (the land, buildings, and other property known as 
DWF South and Crescent Lands at Dubai Waterfront) to the security agent to 
hold these as security agent for and on behalf of Nakheel SPV as agent for the 
sukuk holders.22 The security agent was Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC, which 
entered into a security agency agreement with Nakheel SPV pursuant to which it 
held the two mortgages granted by Nakheel Holdings 1 for the benefit of the 
sukuk holders. Furthermore, Nakheel Holdings 1 also granted a pledge in favor 
                                                          
 20. Author‟s own. 
 21. Offering Circular Nakheel, supra note 9 at 151. 
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of the sukuk holders on 18.89% of all the shares of Nakheel PJSC.23 The 
collateral security structure is illustrated in Figure 3. 
Figure 324 
Nakheel Sukuk Collateral Security Structure 
 
LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NAKHEEL SUKUK 
A.Guarantees 
A legal analysis of the Nakheel Sukuk shows the complexity of its legal 
structure. At first glance, the sukuk holders were sufficiently protected and their 
position was secure. First, Nakheel Holdings 1, Nakheel Holdings 2, and 
Nakheel Holdings 3 had each granted a co-obligor guarantee to Nakheel SPV 
guaranteeing their own and each other’s payment obligations. This co-obligor 
guarantee was the first form of credit enhancement built into the structure. 
Second, Dubai World had issued a guarantee to Nakheel SPV guaranteeing the 
payment obligations of the co-obligors. So if the co-obligors failed to pay, 
Nakheel SPV had recourse to Dubai World’s credit enhancement. Lastly, in 
accordance with a purchase undertaking, Nakheel Holdings 2 had undertaken to 
purchase all of Nakheel SPV’s interests in the sukuk assets at maturity date or at 
                                                          
 23. Id. at 142. 
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the occurrence of a dissolution event.25 One example of such an event was a 
default on the payments by Nakheel Holdings 2, the other Nakheel Holdings as 
co-obligors, or Dubai World.26 This precise scenario is what seemed to arise in 
November 2009, when Dubai World and its subsidiaries wanted to restructure 
their debts and seemed unable to fulfill their payment obligations. Pursuant to 
the purchase undertaking, Nakheel Holdings 2 had to repurchase the sukuk 
assets to enable Nakheel SPV to pay the sukuk holders. However, neither the co-
obligors guarantee, nor the Dubai World guarantee, nor the purchase 
undertaking could help under such circumstances, since none of the parties 
involved were in a position to fulfill the payment obligations.27 
Furthermore, some sukuk holders had assumed that the government of 
Dubai had implicitly guaranteed to fulfill the payment obligations of Dubai 
World since the government fully owned Dubai World.28 However, the 
prospectus had been clear on this point and had specified the risk that the 
government of Dubai did not guarantee any indebtedness or any other liability of 
Dubai World.29 The government of Dubai confirmed this, once again, in 
December 2009 when it stated that it had not offered an explicit guarantee to 
Dubai World.30 
B.Proprietary protection 
All of this need not imply the weakness of the financial structure, 
because several attempts were made to build proprietary protection into the 
structure. By itself, the fact that guarantees and purchase undertakings cannot 
provide full protection is not surprising: this is inherent to an insolvency 
scenario where all parties involved (including the guarantors, as was the case 
here) may be unable to fulfill their obligations. Nor does the convertible aspect 
of the sukuk continue to be attractive, since it does not make sense to obtain 
shares in a company in financial distress. Because the contractual agreements 
(purchase undertakings, guarantees, etc.) are not sufficient to give protection to 
creditors in an insolvency scenario involving all parties (including the 
guarantors), proprietary rights are especially important. The Nakheel Sukuk had 
                                                          
 25. The prospectus mentioned several events which would constitute a dissolution event. See 
Offering Circular Nakheel, supra note 9 at 67. For more on the purchase undertaking, see id. at 142. 
 26. For more on the several events of defaults, see id. at 83-4. 
 27. B. Goud, What can Nakheel sukuk holders expect in a default?, SHARING RISK DOT ORG 
BLOG, Nov. 30, 2009, available at http://investhalal.blogspot.com/2009/11/what-can-nakheel-sukuk-
holders-expect.html. 
 28. R. Kasolowsky & A. Abocar, Legal minefield awaits Dubai’s Nakheel bondholders, 
REUTERS, Dec. 3, 2009, at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5B21YH20091203; A. England 
et. al., Bank creditors unite over crisis, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 2, 2009 at 6; S. Kerr, Tough love 
needed to rebuild the ruins, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 27, 2009 at 2. 
 29. Offering Circular Nakheel, supra note 9 at 35. 
 30. S. Kerr, Dubai World prepares to sell overseas assets, FT.COM, Dec. 7, 2009. 
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certain proprietary rights that were meant to provide Nakheel SPV, and 
eventually the sukuk holders, with property law protections. 
However, the application of property law to these circumstances might 
have been problematic. First of all, an interesting question is whether there was 
a transfer of the underlying tangible assets from Nakheel Holdings 1 to Nakheel 
SPV. As described above, the prospectus mentioned a purchase agreement 
between Nakheel Holdings 1 and Nakheel SPV. Pursuant to this agreement, the 
sukuk assets were sold and delivered to Nakheel SPV, after which these sukuk 
assets were leased to Nakheel Holdings 2 in line with the lease agreement. This 
would indicate a sale-and-lease-back transaction, which from an Islamic 
financial perspective refers to a sukuk al-ijarah structure. The prospectus also 
called the structure a sukuk al-ijarah structure.31 However, the subject of this 
purchase agreement was the sukuk assets and, as described above, these sukuk 
assets were leasehold rights to the underlying tangible assets for a period of 50 
years. This means that there was no proprietary transfer of ownership rights in 
these underlying tangible assets from Nakheel Holdings 1 to Nakheel SPV—
there was merely a transfer of leasehold rights. This makes the transaction a 
lease-and-lease-back transaction, which makes it a sukuk manfaa-ijarah 
structure from an Islamic financial perspective. 
The difference is evident and important. A sale agreement refers to the 
transfer of certain real rights, or property rights, from the originator to the SPV. 
Leasehold interests, however, are not viewed as real rights, or property rights, 
under the relevant laws of the UAE as applicable in the emirate of Dubai.32 
Instead, they are viewed as unregistered personal contractual rights binding the 
parties as opposed to rights attached to the land in question.33 Leases can 
become real or property rights attaching to the underlying land through 
registration, but this had not yet happened. The formal regulations setting out the 
mechanics and processes for such registrations had yet to be issued by the Dubai 
Lands Department (the governmental property registration authority in Dubai) at 
the time of the issuance of the sukuk, and the Nakheel Sukuk prospectus did not 
mention a formal registration relating to these leasehold rights anywhere.34 The 
laws of the UAE are relevant, since they govern the so-called purchase 
agreement. Proprietary protection is more important than a contractual 
agreement—especially in case of insolvency; if there is a transfer of ownership, 
the assets will not form part of the bankruptcy estate of Nakheel Holdings 1, 
while if there is solely a contractual agreement, the assets will form part of the 
bankruptcy estate of Nakheel Holdings 1, and Nakheel SPV will be put on the 
list of creditors. 
                                                          
 31. Offering Circular Nakheel, supra note 11 at 54. 
 32. Id. at 130. 
 33. ABA GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS: A COMPARISON OF CROSS-
CULTURAL ISSUES AND SUCCESSFUL APPROACHES, 993-94 (J.R. Silkenet, J.M. Aresty & J. Klosek 
eds., 2009). 
 34. Id. 
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However, this does not mean that the sukuk holders did not have any 
proprietary protection. In order to secure the position of the sukuk holders as 
secured creditors through Nakheel SPV, certain security rights were granted. 
The security rights were meant to secure the payment obligations of the co-
obligors; in other words, they were meant to provide more protection in case the 
co-obligor guarantees would not be sufficient. First, Nakheel Holdings 1 had 
granted a fully perfected right of pledge in favor of the sukuk holders to 18.89% 
of all the shares of Nakheel PJSC. But, given the financial situation of the 
Nakheel group as a whole and its request for restructuring, the collateral of this 
right of pledge (i.e., the shares) could be worth much less than expected.35 
Therefore, this share pledge could not offer the proprietary protection for which 
sukuk holders hoped. In addition, there were also rights of mortgages granted by 
Nakheel Holdings 1 to the underlying tangible assets. These security interests 
were held by Dubai Islamic Bank as the security agent for and on behalf of 
Nakheel SPV for the benefit of the sukuk holders. From a structural perspective, 
this could give the proprietary protection sukuk holders were looking for. 
An analysis of the financial structure of the Nakheel Sukuk does not 
reveal anything unusual. Nevertheless, testing the legal tenability of the structure 
shows certain complex and unanswered issues inherent to the legal system of 
Dubai. First, the proprietary protection given by the mortgages can be infringed 
by certain elements built into the legal system of Dubai. The prospectus referred 
to two fully perfected rights of mortgages, but taking a closer look at the 
perfection of security interests in Dubai raises questions about the perfection of 
these security rights. Perfection of rights of mortgages to real property in Dubai 
requires registration of the mortgage agreement in the lands register at the Dubai 
Lands Department.36 However, only the interests of lenders licensed by the 
central bank of Dubai can be registered.37 Although Dubai Islamic Bank was a 
licensed bank in Dubai, it was the security agent and not the lender in the 
transaction.38 A structure involving a licensed bank acting as a security agent for 
all lenders on any enforcement of the security in the UAE, as was the case 
within this structure, was untested before the UAE courts,39 and the 
enforceability of the rights of mortgages could, therefore, not be assured.40 Even 
if the security interests could be upheld before the UAE courts as perfected 
rights of mortgages, the sukuk holders could still face a delay. Pursuant to Law 
10 of 2005, proceedings can be brought against the government of Dubai and 
government entities (which could include Nakheel Holdings 1 as grantor of the 
                                                          
 35. B. Goud, What can Nakheel sukuk holders expect in a default?, SHARING RISK DOT ORG 
BLOG, Nov. 30, 2009, available at http://investhalal.blogspot.com/2009/11/what-can-nakheel-sukuk-
holders-expect.html. 
 36. R. Abraham, S. Long & S. Henderson, Real estate finance in Dubai, INT‟L FIN. L. REV., 
Jan. 1, 2008, available at http://www.iflr.com/Article/1984124/Real-estate-finance-in-Dubai.html. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Offering Circular Nakheel, supra note 9 at 132. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 46. 
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rights of mortgages) before the courts of Dubai, but the claimants must first have 
given details of their claim to the Attorney General of Dubai and have entered 
into settlement negotiations for a period of two months.41 
C.Private international law 
Another potential complication in Dubai’s legal system pertains to 
private international law. For instance, certain documents from this transaction, 
such as the declaration of trust and the guarantees given by the co-obligors and 
Dubai World, were governed by English law.42 Nakheel SPV had chosen the 
English courts to have non-exclusive jurisdiction in connection with the 
declaration of trust and any proceedings arising from it.43 The sukuk holders 
hoped that English law would apply to these transaction documents and that 
their arguments would find traction in English courts.44 A ruling by English 
courts favorable to the sukuk holders would have to be enforced in Dubai, 
because the majority of the assets were located within the UAE and, as a result, 
there could be insufficient Dubai World assets located outside the UAE to 
satisfy a judgment obtained from an English court.45 However, the enforcement 
of the judgment in Dubai could raise several problems.46 
The UAE courts probably would not recognize the jurisdictional choice 
of the parties, since UAE courts almost always have jurisdiction in such 
matters.47 The prospectus already warned sukuk holders that “[u]nder . . . Dubai 
law, the courts [were] unlikely to enforce an English judgment without 
reexamining the merits of the claim and [would] not observe the choice by the 
parties of English law as the governing law of the transaction.”48 UAE law does 
not recognize the concept of trust or beneficial interests, so there was 
uncertainty on the declaration of trust.49 However, there was also an agency 
declaration concerning the relationship between Nakheel SPV and the sukuk 
holders and this declaration was subject to, and enforceable under, UAE law as a 
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matter of contract.50 The bankruptcy remoteness51 of Nakheel SPV was not at 
stake, so this would not have been a problem.52 But what could have created a 
problem for the enforcement were the interest of the government in the 
companies and the legislation of the UAE on this subject. Enforcement of 
proceedings against the government and government entities (which could 
include Dubai World and all three Nakheel Holdings) would create legal 
obstacles. The prospectus mentioned that “[l]aw No. 10 of 2005 amending 
Government Lawsuit No. (3) of 1996 (as amended by Law No. 4 of 1997) 
[provided] that an establishment of the government may be sued, but that no 
debt or obligation of such establishment [could] be recovered by way of an 
attachment on its properties or assets.”53 The parties waived sovereign 
immunity, but due to lack of precedent and authority, it was uncertain how a 
court would construe Law No. 3 of 2006 and, accordingly, there was no 
assurance as to whether such a waiver of immunity was valid and binding under 
the law of Dubai.54  Consequently, it was possible that such a waiver could be 
revoked.55 This means that even if the rights of mortgages were perfected and a 
period of two months was observed, recovering payments obligations by 
attachment on properties or assets of the Nakheel Holdings or Dubai World 
could be impossible due to their governmental characteristics. Not even a 
sovereign immunity waiver could undo this. 
CONCLUSION 
What the outcome of legal proceedings would have been is anyone’s 
guess. What actually happened was that in December 2009, Abu Dhabi, also an 
emirate of the UAE, granted Dubai a $10 billion loan to repay some of its 
debts.56 This loan was used to refund the sukuk holders their principal amount at 
maturity date, and the sukuk were redeemed. Abu Dhabi’s loan was 
understandable given the connection of the seven emirates; escalation of the 
situation would have affected the other emirates as well. In March 2010, there 
was good news for the bondholders of two other outstanding sukuk of Nakheel 
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that come due in 2010 and 2011: they will be paid back in full as well.57 
However, the damage on the sukuk market is already done. The first quarter of 
2010 clearly illustrates the negative impact of the Dubai Debt Crisis on the 
Islamic finance market.58 Nevertheless, the government of Dubai announced in 
March 2010 that it is considering offering Nakheel trade creditors a large-scale 
sukuk as part of its debt restructuring plan to boost the regional sukuk market 
again.59 
This article has shown that the legal implications of the Nakheel Sukuk 
were not connected to the legal structure of Islamic financial instruments as 
such. They were inherent to the legal structure of this particular transaction and 
to the legal environment in which it was set up. The sukuk holders in this 
transaction had not adequately considered UAE and Dubai’s financial 
legislation; in particular, they failed to take into account the legal framework in 
Dubai concerning specific requirements for granting security rights such as the 
rights created in a mortgage agreement. The strong legal protection and specific 
legal limitations concerning governmental entities under UAE law also had a 
major impact on the legal options of parties. Lastly, private international law, 
and the enforcement of (foreign) judgments in the UAE in particular, formed 
what would have been a big obstacle if legal proceedings had ensued. The 
lessons learned from the impact of the Dubai Debt Crisis on the Nakheel Sukuk 
may be valuable when structuring sukuk transactions in the future. What is more, 
some of these lessons may also be valuable for structuring other financial and 
commercial transactions in Dubai, because the legal system of the UAE and 
Dubai in particular was at the root of the legal complications of the financial 
structure of Nakheel Sukuk. 
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